THE CHILD'S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF
CONSORTIUM DAMAGES: A LOGICAL
AND SYMPATHETIC APPEAL

Legal history shows that artificial islands of exceptions, created
from the fear that the legal process will not work, usually do not
withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into oblivion.1
Jodie Lynn Suter was nine years old when her mother was involved in an automobile accident. The accident left Jodie's mother
seriously disabled and unable to provide care or support for her
child. Jodie's mother brought an action in negligence against
Leonard, the driver of the other automobile. Jodie also brought
an action against Leonard, claiming that his negligence deprived
her of the "society, care, protection, support and affection of her
'2
mother."
If her mother had been killed in the accident, there would be
little doubt that Jodie's claim for loss of consortium 3 in a wrongful
death action would have survived a demurrer.4 If the accident
1. Dillon v. Legg, 68 CaL 2d 728, 747, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72,85 (1968).
2. Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 745, 120 CaL Rptr. 110, 111
(1975).
3. Basically, consortium consists of love, affection, protection, support,
services, companionship, care, society and in the marital situation, sexual relations. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.D.C. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). The change in the meaning of consortium was
noted by the court in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 123,
126 S.E. 307, 309 (1925):
In its original application the term "consortium" was not confined
to society, companionship, and conjugal affection. Service was a
prominent, if not a predominant, factor; not so much the service
which resulted in the performance of labor or the earning of wages
as those which contributed aid and assistance in all the relations
of domestic life.
4. CAL. Civ. PRo. COD. § 377 (West 1973) provides:
When the death of a person not being a minor, or when the death
of a minor person who leaves surviving him ... child or children
...
is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs
. may maintain an action for damages against the person causing
*
the death.... In every action under this section, such damages
may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be
just ....
See Arizmnendi v. System Leasing Corp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 730, 93 Cal. Rptr.

had involved Jodie instead of her mother, her mother undoubtedly
could have stated a claim for loss of Jodie's "society, care, protection, support and affection."5 However, Jodie's claim was dismissed because no statute or precedent supported a child's right
to recover for negligent injury to its parent. That dismissal was
affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal of California.0
Surprisingly, the California Supreme Court-noted for such fa7 Dillon
miliar decisions as Rowland v. Christian,
v. Legg,8 and
411 (1971) (illegitimate children have right to bring action for wrongful
death of parent); Fiske v. Wilkie, 67 Cal. App. 2d 440, 154 P.2d 725 (1945)
(children allowed to recover for wrongful death of mother); Kerrison v.
Unger, 135 Cal. App. 607, 27 P.2d 927 (1934) (children held entitled to maintain action for their mother's death).
5. CAL. Civ. PRo. COD. § 376 (West 1973) provides:
The parents of a legitimate unmarried minor child, acting jointly,
may maintain an action for injury to such child caused by the
wrongful act or neglect or another...
Any such action may be maintained against the person causing
the injury. If any other person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect the action may also be maintained against such
other person. The death of the child or ward shall not abate the
parents' or guardian's cause of action for his injury as to damages
occurring before his death.
In every action under this section, such damages may be given
as under all the circumstances of the case may be just ....
See Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952). The court reasoned
that those damages which "!may be just" include compensation for the services of the child as well as the "loss of protection, comfort, society and companionship." Id. at 425, 242 P.2d at 977; Shockley v. Priver, 66 Wis. 2d 394,
225 N.W.2d 495 (1975) (parent allowed to recover for loss of comfort and
society of an injured minor child). Contra, Hair v. County of Monterey,
45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975). The court did not allow
the parents of a negligently injured child to recover damages for the loss
of society and companionship of the child. However, the decision was based
on the technical distinction that the child's action for the injury had been
concluded prior to the effective date of Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974) which had recognized
the right of both husband and wife to recover for loss of consortium. Moreover, the court reasoned that "logically, there is no objection to an extension
of the rule laid down therein so as to permit recovery by parents for lost
pleasure, society, comfort and companionship sustained by reason of injuries
inflicted upon their child." Hair v. County of Monterey, supra, at 545, 119
Cal. Rptr. at 643-44. Since the only basis for denying relief was the
inability to apply Rodriguez retroactively and the court recognized that the
"law favors the parent-child relationship sufficiently to permit a parent to
recover for lost comfort, society and companionship," it would appear that
in the future such a recovery will be allowed. Id. at 545-46, 119 Cal. Rptr.

at 644.

6. Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 120 Cal Rptr. 110 (1975).
7. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (landowner's liability held to be based upon the reasonable man test rather than the distinctions between trespassers, licensees and invitees).
8. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (parent allowed
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Brown v. MerZo 9 -refused review.'0
This Comment presents the case for Jodie's claim-and for the

claims of all children deprived of their parents' consortium by another's negligence. It takes the position that statute, precedent and
tort principles compel the recognition of such an action where, in
the words of the Suter Court of Appeal, "there can be little question
of the reality of the loss suffered by a child deprived of the society
and care of its parent.""
TBE CHmw's CLnAi CARRIEs BOTH LOGICAL
AND SYmPATHETIC APPEAL

The child's claim for loss of his parent's consortium is set in a
framework that perhaps can best be understood in terms of five
typical situations:
1. The Husband's Action for Loss of Consortium. Suppose the
wife is injured in an automobile accident occasioned by defendant's
negligence. In such a situation the wife has an action against defendant in negligence, and the husband has an action against defendant for loss of his wife's consortium. The husband's action
was recognized at early common law;12 in most jurisdictions to-

day, courts recognize the husband's right to loss of consortium damages.'"
to recover for emotional trauma from witnessing the death of her child although not within the traditional zone of danger).

9. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal Rptr. 388 (1973) (negligent hostdriver held responsible for his wrongdoing regardless of whether the passenger accepted the ride without giving compensation).
10. The California Supreme Court denied a hearing in this case on May
22, 1975.
11. 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 746, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (1975).
12. At common law, the "husband's right to the consortium of his wife
was clear and definite." Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MIcH. L. Rzv. 1, 2 (1923). In the first case to allow a husband
to recover for the loss of consortium of his wif% the court held that "...
the action is not brought in respect of the harm done to the wife, but it
is brought for the particular loss of the husband, for that he lost the company
of his wife, which is only a damage and loss to himself, for which he shall
have the action." Guy v. Livesey, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (K.B. 1619). The husband maintained an action whether the loss of consortium was due to intentional or negligent injury to the wife.
13. E.g., Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alas. 1974); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974);
Diaz v. Eli Lilly Co., 302 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 1973); American Asbestos Tex-

2. The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium. Suppose the husband is injured in an automobile accident occasioned by defendant's
negligence. In this situation the husband has an action against defendant in negligence, and the wife has an action against defendant
for loss of her husband's consortium. Early common law did not
recognize the wife's action; 14 most state courts have come to recognize the wife's right to loss of consortium damagesY
3. The Parents'Action for Loss of Consortium. Suppose the child
is injured in an automobile accident occasioned by defendant's
negligence. In this situation the child has an action against the
defendant in negligence, and the parents have an action against defendant for loss of their child's consortium. The child's action was
not recognized at early common law, 16 but it is recognized totile Corp. v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., - N.H. , 330 A.2d 451
(1974); Liebler v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 76 Misc. 2d 701, 351 N.Y.S.2d
480 (App. Div. 1974).
14. H. CLAm, LAW OF DolMsTIc RELATIONS § 10.5 at 274 (1968); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MIc. L. REv. 1, 2
(1923).
15. In Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889), a woman was
allowed to recover for loss of consortium due to the intentional alienation
of her husband's affection. See, e.g., Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 277
Ky. 189, 126 S.W.2d 143 (1939); Cravens v. Louisville & N.R.R., 195 Ky. 257,
242 S.W. 628 (1922); Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101, 28 S.W. 328 (1894);
Sheard v. Oregon Elec. Ry., 137 Ore. 341, 2 P.2d 916 (1931). Contra,
Anderson v. McGill Club, 51 Nev. 16, 266 P. 913 (1928), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 557 (1928); Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d
166 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970 (1967). In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
183 F.2d 811 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), a woman was
allowed to recover for loss of consortium caused by the negligent injury to
her husband. The history of the action in California is illustrative of the
long struggle for recognition of a right of recovery for loss of consortium
damages. Originally, the California courts followed the common law rule
allowing a husband to recover for loss of his wife's consortium. Gist v.
French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955). In Deshotel v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958), the court
refused to extend to a wife the right to recover for loss of consortium due
to negligent injury. Then, in West v. City of San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469,
353 P.2d 929, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1960), the court denied the action for loss
of consortium to the husband as well as the wife. Finally, a complete reversal was made by the court in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 12 Cal.
3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974) which held that both the
husband and wife could recover for loss of consortium. For a list of those
jurisdictions allowing recovery to the wife see id. at 389-90, nn.4 & 5, 525
P.2d at 673, nn.4 & 5, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 769, nn.4 &5.
16. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH. L. REV.
177 (1916). Historically, the rights of the child were vested in the father
as head of the household.
In Roman law we find all manner of interests of dependent members of the household so treated as interests of the head of the
household as to show that he is standing legally for a group of
kindred which is or was the jural unit. Id. at 179.
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day.17 Early common law recognized only the father's action for
s
today
loss of consortium, under the doctrine of pater familias;'
each parent has a cause of action for loss of the child's consortium.19
4. The Action for Wrongful Death. Suppose the husband and
child are killed in an automobile accident occasioned by defendant's
negligence. In this situation the wife or mother has an action in
jurisdictions that have enacted a wrongful death statute, both with
respect to the husband's death and with respect to the child's
death.20 Similarly, if the father is killed in an automobile accident
an express
occasioned by defendant's negligence, the child has 21
statutory action in wrongful death against the defendant.

5. The Child's Action for Loss of Consortium. Suppose the
parent is injured in an automobile accident occasioned by defendant's negligence. In such a situation the parent has an action in
22
However, no jurisdiction permits
negligence against defendant.

the child an action for loss of consortium.

23

17. The child alone has a cause of action for two elements of damage:
physical pain and mental suffering, and prospective medical expense and loss
of earnings after majority. RESTATEMmT OF TORTS § 703 (1938).
18. Jones v. Brown, 170 Eng. Rep. 334 (1794); Norton v. Jason, 82 Eng.
Rep. 809 (K.B. 1653).
19. Cases cited note 4 supra.
20. Since a cause of action for death did not exist at common law, the
right of recovery is based solely on statute. In California the wrongful death
action is codified in CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 377 (West 1973):
When the death of a person not being a minor, or when the death
of a minor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or
wife or child or children or father or mother, is caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, and his dependent
parents, if any, who are not heirs, or personal representatives on
their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the person
causing the death ....
21. Id.
22. The husband's right to recover for his own injuries was recognized
at common law. Under CAL. Civ. CODE § 370 (West 1973) a wife is also
entitled to recover on her own cause of action for physical injury.
23. The recognition of the interest of the child in the society, care and
protection of the parent "has run into a stone wall where there is merely
negligent injury to the parent." W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 125 at 896 (4th
ed. 1971). Traditionally, the child had no action against a third person for
an injury to the parent-child relationship. T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 137
at 264 (student's ed. 1907); Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion
of Consortium, 61 CoLum. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1961). However, some jurisdictions now recognize the right of a child to recover for loss of consortium
caused by the intentional alienation of a parent's affection. Daily v. Parker,

It is with the fifth situation that this Comment is concerned.
the
Viewed in the framework of the other four situations, surely
24
child's claim "carries both logical and sympathetic appeal."
THE CHm's CLAIM HAs BOTH STATUTORY
AM PRECEDENTIAL SUPPORT

In addition to the logical and sympathetic appeal of a child's claim
for loss of consortium, section 1714 of the California Civil Code provides further support for the recognition of this cause of action:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts,
but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary
care or skill in the management of his property or person, except
so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself .... 25
This code section, which has remained unchanged since enacted in
152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich.
1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); Heck v.
Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400,
37 N.W.2d 543 (1949). Contra, Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190
P.2d 984 (1948) (decision based on CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.5 (West 1954)
denying cause of action for alienation of affection); Katz v. Katz, 197
Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App.
337, 98 N.E.2d 74 (1951). In California, a child was allowed to recover for
loss of consortium of the parent when the child was intentionally abducted.
Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963). Yet
the action for loss of consortium due to the negligent injury of a parent was
not recognized at common law nor is it recognized in any jurisdiction today.
Early v. United States, 474 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1973); Pleasant v. Washington
Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hill v. Sibley Memorial
Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1952); Juene v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77
Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954); Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 59 A.L.R.2d
445 (1957); Hawkins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973); Hoffman v.
Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184
Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915); Hayrynen v. White Pine Copper Co., 9 Mich.
App. 452, 157 N.W.2d 502 (1968); Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378,
263 N.W. 154 (1935); Stout v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 172 Mo. App.
113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d
366 (1972); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972);
Dunhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc. 2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. 1973);
Gibson v. Johnson, 144 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio App. 1956). The only recognition of
the action has been given by lower courts. Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp.
868 (D. Hawaii 1955); Bush v. American Standard, Inc., No. 258, 574 (2d
Jud. D. Washoe Cty., Nev. 1970), reviewed, Comment, Consortium ...
Child's Right to Recover for Negligent Interference with the Parent-Child
Relationship, 4 Iwm. LEGAL F. 552 (1971). These cases have been subsequently overruled in Meredith v. Scruggs, 244 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1957) and
General Electric Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972).
Thus,
judicial protection of the child's interest in maintaining the family relationship against negligent invasion has been universally denied.
24. Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 746, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111
(1975).
25. CA .. Civ. CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
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1872, "serves as the foundation of our negligence law."2 6
The loss suffered by the child when his parent is negligently injured is a legally cognizable injury within the contemplation of section 1714. As the Suter court recognized, "there can be little question of the reality of the loss suffered by a child deprived of the
society and care of its parent. ' 27 A child has an interest in the
society and affection of his parent.28 Furthermore, the society,
education, protection and love of a parent is necessary for the
child's welfare and development. 29 "The child, for the full and
harmonious development of his personality, needs love and understanding."3 0 When the child is deprived of his parents' society,
care, protection and affection he suffers a real injury. In recognizing the husband-wife right to consortium, the court in Rodriguez
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.31 held that the loss of companionship,
emotional support and love are real injuries. Similarly, the child's
loss of his parents' love, society and protection deprives him of the
essentials for a healthy development and thus results in a real injury to the child.
Protection of the child against this type of injury to the family
relationship is equally important to the state.8 2 Since the charac26. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).

27. Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 746, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111

(1975).
28. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mhcx. L. Rzv.
177, 185 (1916).
29. Note, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties,73 YALE L.J. 151, 158 (1963). In discussing problems
concerning child custody, the author recognized the child's needs and interests:
The mutual interaction between adult and child, which might be
described in such terms as love, affection, basic trust, and confidence, is considered essential for the child's successful development, and is the basis of what may be termed psychological parenthood'....
30. United Nations Declaration of Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386
(xiv), 14 GAOR -, U.N. Doc. A/4249 (1959).

31. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 400, 525 P.2d 669, 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 776 (1974).
When a person is injured either intentionally or negligently, to the
extent that such person can no longer be a companion and is no
longer capable of giving love, affection, society, comfort and sexual
relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and
real personal loss. Id. at 400, 525 P.2d at 681, 115 Cal. Rptr. at
777, citing Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio
St. 2d 65, 74, 258 N.E.2d 230, 235 (1970).
32. Heck v. Schupp, 394 fI1. 296, 300, 68 N.E.2d 464, 466 (1946) (husband allowed to recover for alienation of wife's affection).

ter of the child has an impact on society "it is of the highest importance to the child and society that its rights to receive the benefits
derived from its mother [or father] be protected. '33 Gradually,
the courts have extended protection to the relational interest of the
family. Courts are often called upon to secure the rights of an
individual against physical harms and harms of appropriation, 4 as
well as negligent invasion of the family relationship.35 When the
relational interest of a family member is destroyed by the intentional alienation of another member's affection, the injured party
is allowed to recover.3 6 When a family member loses the love, society and protection of a parent or child due to wrongful death,
the injured party maintains a cause of action. 37 However, when
negligent injury of a member destroys the family relationship it
is only the parent, husband or wife that is allowed to recover. The
child's interest in the protection of the family relationship against
negligent invasion is not legally enforceable. Although the manner
and degree of the injury varies in the cases of alienation of affection, wrongful death and negligent injury, redress should be premised upon an invasion of a right. The court's recognition of the
reality of the child's loss coupled with a readiness to protect against
injury to the family relationship gives support to the proposition
that children are entitled to legal protection of the family relationship against negligent invasion.
In order to bring an action for loss of consortium of a negligently
injured parent under section 1714, the child must also be considered
a person within the contemplation of the statute. However, children have long been denied the status of "person" in both the social
and legal systems. 88 It is only recently that legal scholars have
called for the recognition of the humanity of a child before the
33. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Mlinn. 400, 403, 37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1949) (child
allowed to recover damages for the enticement of her mother away from
the family home).
34. Green, RelationalInterests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 463 (1934).
35. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH.L. Rsv.
177, 179 (1916).
36. Cases cited notes 15 & 23 supra. However, according to California
statute no cause of action is recognized for alienation of affection. CAL. Civ.
CODE. § 43.5 (West 1974).
37. Cases cited note 3 supra.

38. Traditionally, children have been regarded as chattels of the family

and wards of the state. Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDuc.
REV. 487, 489 (1973). Either the parent or the state maintains the power

to regulate the activities and determine the rights of the child. Note, The
Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of ParentalConsent, 60

L. RFv. 305, 314 (1974).

VA.
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law. 9 Courts have also begun to recognize that children are persons under the law.40 Yet, the acceptance of the child's humanity
has not necessarily led to the recognition of the child's legal rights.
Although the legal system traditionally has been concerned with
the protection of rights, 41 consideration of children's rights has
42
been minimal.
Despite this general reluctance of the courts to recognize that
children are persons with standing to assert their rights, the negligence area of tort law provides support for this proposition. Al39. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAm. L.Q. 343 (1972).
In setting out a Bill of Rights for children, the authors proposed that "a child
has a moral right and should have a legal right . . . [t]o be regarded as
a person within the family, at school and before the law." Id. at 347.
40. In his dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243
(1972), Justice Douglas stated that "children are 'persons' within the meaning of the Bill of Rights." In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968),
the Court recognized that illegitimate children "are clearly 'persons' within
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
41. Speca & Wehrman, Protecing the Rights of Children in Divorce Cases
in Missouri, 38 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1, 38 (1969).
42. The movement for recognition of children's rights has been primarily
in the areas of education and juvenile law. In upholding a child's right to
remain silent during the pledge of allegiance, the Court in West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), established that a child
has rights guaranteed by the first amendment. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court again
protected children's exercise of first amendment rights in allowing students
to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam war. The Court has also
held that students in public schools are entitled to protection under the due
process clause. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). However, despite the
Court's past acknowledgement of a child's right to education, (Brown v.
Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)), in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), such a right was expressly
denied.
In juvenile proceedings, the Court has generally applied the constitutional
guarantees associated with adult criminal prosecutions. In Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948), the Court extended to juveniles the protection of the
fourteenth amendment against coerced confessions in a state trial. Children
in juvenile proceedings have been guaranteed the procedural safeguards of
the sixth and fourteenth amendments. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). However, the right to a trial by jury has
not been extended to children in juvenile court delinquency proceedings.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Recently, the right of a
child to protection against double jeopardy was recognized by the Court.
Breed v. Jones, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975).

though at common law a child could not maintain an action for
his personal injuries against a negligent tortfeasor, 48 such an action
is recognized today. 44 The injured child has an action against the
tortfeasor for damages for physical and mental suffering as well
as for future loss of earning power. 45 Moreover, the injured child
can maintain such an action for damages regardless of whether the
tortfeasor is a stranger or the child's brother, sister or parent. 40
It has also been recognized that a child has standing to bring an
action in negligence under section 1714. In Beard v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,47 the court held that a child need

not base the liability of a tortfeasor on the attractive nuisance doctrine but rather on section 1714 "which imposes general liability
on every person for injuries occasioned to others by want of ordinary care in the management of his property." 48 Therefore, it appears that a child is a person with standing to assert his right of
compensation for personal injury under section 1714.
The California Supreme Court's trend toward abandoning untenable common law precedents in order to conform to the changing
needs and conditions of society seems to add additional support for
the recognition of the child's cause of action. The common law is
not static, but rather adjusts to the new developments in social and
43. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MicH. L. REv.
177, 179 (1916).
44. Durkee v. Central Pac. R.R., 56 Cal. 388, 38 Am. R. 59 (1880). After
enumerating the damages which the parent can recover when a child is negligently injured, the court stated that "[d]amages awarded upon any other
grounds than these clearly belong to the person corporally injured, whose
right to sue, it must be remembered, is enetirely unaffected by the action of
his parent or master." Id. at 392, 38 Am. R. at 65. In California, the chila's
right to maintain an action against a negligent tortfeasor is codified in CAL.
CIV. CODE § 42 (West 1954) which provides: "A minor may enforce his rights
by civil action, or other legal proceedings, in the same manner as a person
of full age, except that a guardian must conduct the same."
45. Stone v. Yellow Cab Co., 221 P.2d 131 (Cal. App. 1950). The court
also held that a parent "(1) may recover the value of the child's services
during the period of minority, and (2) the expenses of medical care." Id.
at 135.
46. In Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), the California
Supreme Court declined to create an exception to the general principle of
liability by denying a child the right to sue a sibling in tort for negligence.
The parental immunity doctrine was eliminated by the court in Gibson V.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). In allowing
a child to maintain an action against his parent for negligent injury, the
court again enunciated the general legal principle that "when there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception." Id. at 922, 479
P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (citation omitted).
47. 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 84 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1970).
48. Id. at 136, 84 CaL Rptr. at 454.
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economic life. 49 In fulfilling the historical function of the common
law, the California Supreme Court has reevaluated the precedents
of the past in light of the needs and concerns of the present.50
Courts have a creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost
its touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to
meet new conditions and new moral values. 51
In California, the supreme court has eagerly accepted this challenge
52
of judicial activism.
The thrust of tort reform in California is twofold. The courts
have sought to eliminate areas of historical tort immunity while
expanding the scope of tort liability.5"
The negligence principle is being constantly expanded so as to clear
out pockets of vestigial immunity and at the same time limitations
to liability that inhere in the negligence principle are giving
way. 54
The denial of the child's claim for loss of consortium may be characterized as an "immunity" for the tortfeasor. 55 In this instance,
the tortfeasor is allowed to injure the child by depriving him of
the love, society, care and protection of his parent with impunity.
However, the tortfeasor would not be immune from liability if the
49. Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 642, 59 A.L.R.2d 445, 451 (1957);
Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 168, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (1962).
50. Comment, Judicial Activism in Tort Reform: The Guest Statute
Exemplar and a Proposal for Comparative Negligence, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1566 (1974).
51. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL.
L.F. 230, 232.
52. See generally, Comment, Judicial Activism in Tort Reform: The
Guest Statute Exemplar and a Proposal for Comparative Negligence, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1566 (1974).

53. Id. at 1587.
54. James, Inroadson Old Tort Concepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226 (1954).
55. This characterization may not strictly conform to the definition of a
traditional immunity which has been stated as an "exemption, as from serving in an office, or performing duties which the law generally requires other
citizens to perform."

BLAcK's

LAW

DicrxoxARY 885 (4th ed. 1968).

How-

ever, the scope of an immunity appears to have been expanded by the California Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian,69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The court eliminated the landowner's "immunity"
from liability which had been predicated upon the classifications of trespasser, licensee and invitee. In the instant case, it would appear that the
tortfeasor's "immunity" from liability which is predicated upon the classifications of husband, wife, parent and child is clearly within the scope of the
Rowland characterization of an immunity.

status of the injured party was that of husband, wife or parent.
The perpetuation of such an immunity seems to be inconsistent
with the California Supreme Court's policy of elimination of tort
immunity through extension of tort liability.
Traditional immunities have been eliminated in diverse areas of
tort law. The intrafamilial immunities have gradually given way
to the principle of liability for negligently caused harm.50 The
doctrine of sovereign immunity was eliminated in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District.57 Charitable immunities have similarly dis59 the
appeared. 58 In Rowland v. Christian,
court eliminated landlord immunities based on the distinctions between invitee, licensee
and trespasser. The immunity granted by the California automobile guest statute6 ° was discarded by the court in Brown v.
Merlo.61 The fundamental principle supporting the elimination
of tort immunities is that in the absence of statute or compelling
reason of public policy, each person proximately injured by the
negligent act of another must be compensated. 62
The elimination of tort immunities has been coupled with the extension of tort liability. The California Supreme Court has utilized
section 1714 as a basis upon which to expand tort liability. In Rowland v. Christian,63 the court extended the liability of a landowner
for injutries to individuals who come onto his land by application
of the general principle "that a person is liable for injuries caused
by his failure to exercise reasonable care."6 4 The court observed
that "it is clear that in the absence of statutory provision declaring
56. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971)
(parental immunity for negligence); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d

65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (interspousal immunity for intentional torts);
Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (interspousal immunity for negligence); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d
218 (1955) (intrafamily tort immunity).
57. 55 Cal 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). The general
principle of liability was expressed by the court in these terms: "In formulating 'rules' and 'exceptions' we are apt to forget that when there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception." Id. at 219, 359 P.2d

at 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
58. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939).
59. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
60. CAL. VE_. CODE § 17158 (West 1971). The guest statute basically provides that the driver of a vehicle owes no duty of care to a passenger who
accepts a ride without giving compensation.
61. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
62. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694-95, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal Rptr.
102, 104 (1962).
63. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
64. Id. at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
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an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section
1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception should be made unless
clearly supported by public policy." 65 Thus, in the absence of
statutory provision or public policy, the general principle of tort
law in California affords "protection from negligence" 66 through
the extension of tort liability.
In order to determine whether a departure from the liability principle is justified, the courts usually consider the foreseeabiity of
the harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered and the moral blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct. 67 The imposition of a legal duty
is largely an expression of these policy considerations. 68 In the
absence of such policy considerations, the courts have expanded the
scope of tort liability by imposing a uniform duty of reasonable
care on all tortfeasors.
In light of the principles of tort law in California, a strong case
can be made for allowing a child to recover for loss of consortium
due to negligent injury to a parent. The tortfeasor who negligently
injures a person should not be granted immunity because the injured party is a child rather than a husband, wife or parent. Since
there is no statute expressly denying recovery to the child and public policy supports elimination of tort immunities, the general principle of liability embodied in section 1714 should be applied to allow
the child recovery when his parent is negligently injured. Further,
the duty of reasonable care should be imposed on the tortfeasor who
negligently injures a person, regardless of the status of that person.
Thus, it appears that both statute and precedent of California tort
65. Id.
66. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 870, 506 P.2d 212, 223, 106 Cal. Rptr.
388, 399 (1973).

67. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 661, 564, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
68. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
The court quoted Prosser in holding that duty is
a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself * * * But it should be recognized that 'duty' is not
sacrosanct in itself but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916,
69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.

law support the recognition of a child's claim for loss of consortium
damages due to negligent injury to the parent.
No SUBSTANTIAL RATIONALE SUPPORTS THE DE AL
OF T

CHILD'S CLAIM

The denial of the child's cause of action for loss of consortium
due to negligent injury to the parent has been predicated upon a
variety of concerns. The court in Suter set forth the predominant
reasons upon which denial of the action has been based in other
jurisdictions. 9 These concerns included the absence of an enforceable claim by the child to the parents' services; 70 the absence of
precedent; 71 the uncertainty of damages; 72 the possibility of
overlap with the parents' recovery;78 the indirectness and derivative nature of the injury; 74 the multiplication of tort claimants
and tort litigation;7 5 the inability of the courts to draw the line
on liability; 7 and the deference to the legislature in making
changes in the well-settled rules of common law. 77
Various writers have proposed that the foregoing reasons for
denying recovery to a child for negligent injury to the parent are
untenable, and that there is no substantial rationale on which to
predicate such a denial.78 The following discussion will attempt
to pierce "the thin veils of reasoning"7 9 which the courts have employed to sustain the denial of the child's cause of action.
At common law, a child had no enforceable right to the services
69. Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 747, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112
(1975).
70. Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 644, 59 A.L.R.2d 445, 450 (1957).
71. Eschenbach v. Banjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 380, 263 N.W. 154, 155 (1935),
rev'd in part, Thill v. Modem Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865
(1969).
72. Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 667,
328 P.2d 449, 451 (1958), rev'd, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.
3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
73. Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 60 (1962).
74. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 405, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1949).
75. Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 380, 263 N.W. 154, 155 (1935),
rev'd in part, Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865
(1969).
76. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 312, 379 P.2d
513, 523 (1963), rev'd, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968).
77. Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 647, 59 A.L.R.2d 445, 453 (1957).
78. Comment, Infants Denied Recovery for Loss of Services of Injured

Parent,20 N.Y.L.F. 406 (1974).

79. Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F.2d 811, 813 (D.D.C.),
U.S. 842 (1950).

cert. denied, 340
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of a parent. 0 As expounded by Blackstone, "the inferior hath no
kind of property in the company, care or assistance of the superior,
as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury."8 1 However, the
consortium action is not based solely on the individual aspect of
loss of services. Together with the value of services, an injured
party may recover for the loss of society, care, protection and affection. 2 A child's right to the support of his parent has been
recognized by the courts and legislature as well as legal scholars.
In allowing a child recovery for alienation of a parent's affection,
the court in Daily v. Parker stated that "children are entitled to
shelter, food, clothing, and schooling and to the social, the moral
support, guidance, and protection of their father. 8 3 In 1955, the
California Legislature enacted the Uniform Civil Liability for Sup84
port Act which specifically compels a parent to support his child.
In his classic discussion of an individual's interests in domestic relations, Roscoe Pound noted the duty of a parent to support his child:
As against the parent, the child may claim: (1) support during
infancy; (2) education and training so far as the situation of the
parent permits, and (3) in case of indigent children of mature years

who are unable to support themselves, maintenance at least so far

as the parent can afford.8 5

Even Blackstone acknowledged man's instincts and feelings which
"move him more effectually than municipal law to support and care
for his child."8 (
80. W. PnossER, LAw OF TORTS § 125 at 896 (4th ed. 1971).

81. 3 BLAcKSTONE, CownVnwTARIES

ON THE LAws OF ENGLAD

§ 142 (3d

ed. 1884).
82. Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 436, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479,
483 (1963).
83. 152 F.2d 174, 175 (7th Cir. 1945).
84. "Every man shall support his wife, and his child; and his parent when
in need." CAL. Ciy. CODE § 242 (West Supp. 1975). "Every woman shall
support her child; and her husband when in need." CAL. CIV. CODE § 243
(West Supp. 1975). See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 196 (West 1954) which states
that "[tlhe parent entitled to the custody of a child must give him support
and education suitable to his circumstances. If the support and education
which the father of a legitimate child is able to give are inadequate, the
mother must assist him to the extent of her ability."
85. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 McH.L. Rnv.
177, 185-86 (1916).
86. 1 BLACKSTONE, Commscumms ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 435
(Chitty's ed. 1866).

Although various courts have cited lack of precedent as a viable
reason for denying the child's recovery, an overwhelming number
of courts have disputed this rationale.8 7 In allowing a woman to
recover for the negligent injury to her hubsand, the court in Montgomery v. Stephan,8 8 held that lack of precedent was not a valid
reason for denying a cause of action:
Were we to rule upon precedent alone, were stability the only reason for our being, we would have no trouble with this case. We
would simply tell the woman to begone, and to take her shattered
husband with her, that we need no longer be affronted by a sight so
repulsive. In so doing we would have vast support from the dusty
books. But dust the decision would remain in our mouths through
the years ahead, a reproach to law and conscience alike. Our oath
89
is to do justice, not to perpetuate error.

The concept that there exist no causes of action except those recognized by precedent was not generally accepted at common law, nor
is it accepted today.9 0
It has been held that the measurement of damages for the loss
of companionship and society would involve sheer conjecture and
that the pecuniary value would be difficult to ascertain.0 1 The
difficulty in assessing damages in tort litigation has long been
recognized. "The law of torts is permeated with recognized wrongs
for which compensation is allowed although the exact extent of injury is difficult to measure." 92 In his treatise on damages, McCormick noted the injustice which would occur if denial of relief were
based on the uncertainty of the damages:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a
perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to
the injured person, and93thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making
any amend for his acts.

While recognizing the difficulties of adjudication, the California Supreme Court held in Dillon v. Legg9" that such difficulties must
87. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Hill v. Sibley Memorial
Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1952); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281
(W.D. Mich. 1949); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962).
88. 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
89. Id. at 37, 101 N.W.2d at 229.

90. Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 435, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479,

482 (1963).
91. Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 667,
328 P.2d 449, 451 (1958), rev'd, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.
3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
92. Comment, Consortium, 34 S.CAL. L. REV. 334, 341 (1961).
93. C. McCoRmIcK, LAw oF DAmAGEs § 27 at 102 (1935).
94. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968).

[VoL. 13: 231, 1975]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

not be allowed to "frustrate the principle that there be a remedy
for every substantive wrong."
Furthermore, the difficulties of ascertainment of damages are
not insurmountable. Courts and juries are required to evaluate
similar losses in wrongful death cases.9 5 The pain and suffering
element of personal injury suits is even less tangible, yet there has
been little reluctance to evaluate damage in this area. Although
money is a poor substitute for the loss of the support, society and
affection of a parent, it is better than denying compensation altogether.
The fear of double recovery has influenced some courts in their
denial of the child's cause of action. In Halberg v. Young,98 the
Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned that the injured parent could recover from the tortfeasor the full damage he had sustained, including compensation for any inability to properly care for his children.
The child is expected to share in the benefit of the parent's recovery.9 7 A similar rationale was used by the court in Deshotel
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,9 to deny a woman recovery for the loss of consortium of her husband:
A judgment obtained by a husband after he is injured by a third
person might include compensation for any impairment of his
ability to participate in a normal married life, and, if his wife is allowed redress for loss of consortium in a separate action, there
would be danger of double recovery. 99
Some courts assume that the trier of fact considers the plight of
children in evaluating the damages of a parent who has been "so
seriously injured as to be unable to give them proper care and attention."'100 Thus, courts reason that the children have been adequately compensated in the parent's cause of action.
The possibility of overlap with the parents' recovery becomes
minimal when the elements of consortium are separately compensated. Although the parent usually recovers for any impairment
of his duty to support the child, the impairment of the child's nor95. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 405, 37 N.W.2d 543, 546 (1949).
96. 41 Hawaii 634, 645, 59 A.L.R.2d 445, 450 (1957).
97. Feneff v. New York Central & Hudson R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 279, 89
N.E. 436, 437 (1909).
98. 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958).
99. Id. at 667, 328 P.2d at 451.
100. Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 647, 59 A.L.R.2d 445, 453 (1957).

mal relationship with the injured parent cannot be recovered. 01
Since the parent is not allowed to include the child's loss of love,
society and companionship in his cause of action, it is only by
chance that the rights of the child are protected.
The child is the loser and should not have to depend on another's
right of action for recompense. That he would ever get just compensation through the father's action for damages is at least uncertain if not actually unlikely.'0 2

The more just and forthright approach to the problem of double
recovery would be to recognize the individual claim of the child.
The parent's cause of action would be limited to the child's pecuniary loss of support of the parent. The child's cause of action would
include the loss of the parent's love, society and protection. The
requirement of joinder would provide "additional protection against
the suggested danger of double recovery."'1

Corp.10 4

3

The court in Rod-

riguez v. Bethlehem Steel
overruled Deshotel by adopting this precise procedure. Employing these procedures in the
child's action will prevent the possibility of double recovery and
will protect the interests of the child in more than a haphazard
fashion.
Various courts have cited the uncertainty and derivative nature
of the injury to the child as a basis for the denial of recovery, particularly because the harm sustained by the child occurs only indirectly as a consequence of the tortfeasor's negligence. 10 5 The
doctrinal distinction between direct and indirect wrong has little
if any significance. 0 6 This rationale has been set aside by those
courts allowing recovery by the wife for the wrongful injury to
her husband.0 7 The Rodriguez court reasoned that the foresee101. Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. OF ILL. L.F. 493,
509.
102. 20 CoRuNiL L.Q. 255, 257 (1935).
103. Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 90, 215 A.2d
1,6 (1965).
104. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). The court
held that the danger of double recovery "can be avoided by joinder."
All that isnecessary to avoid double recovery "isto insure that
each element of the damages isseparate and distinct from all the
others" (citations omitted) and in particular that the wife's recovery does not include any damages for loss of her husband's financial support or other items for which he is primarily entitled
to be compensated. Id. at 406, 525 P.2d at 684-85, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 780-81.
105. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 405, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1949).
106. Green, Protection of the Family Under Tort Law, 10 HAsTmnGs L.J.
237, 238 (1959).
107. Hitaffer v.Argonne, 183 F.2d 811, 815 (D.D.C. 1950), Rodriguez v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
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ability of the risk was the critical factor in determining whether
an injury is direct.'0 8 The court concluded that "one who negligently causes a severely disabling injury to an adult may reasonably
expect that the injured person is married and that his or her spouse
will be adversely affected by that injury."' 0 9 By parity of reasoning, the tortfeasor may reasonably expect that the injured person
is married and that his or her child will be adversely affected by
the injury.
The possibility of multiplicity of tort claimants and tort litigation
based upon a single tort has been cited as a basis for denying the
child relief."10 A Minnesota court in Eschenbach v. Benjamin"predicted "litigation almost without end" if a wife or child were
allowed to recover for the negligent injury to the husband-father.
However, this concern has been summarily dismissed by several
courts, 112 citing the injustice which would ensue from such a
policy.
If you admit that the conduct of defendant was a wrong to the
plaintiff, it is no argument merely to say that a large number of
suits will arise where all the children in a large family have suffered the same loss. All who are wronged should be allowed recovery against the wrongdoer.113

The inability of the courts to draw the line on liability as a basis
for denying recovery in various actions has been recognized by several courts. 1 4 In Deshotel, the court reasoned that if recovery
were allowed for the wife, then other members of the family would
seek to enforce similar claims. "[T] he courts would be faced with
the perplexing task of determining where to draw the line with
108. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 399, 525 P.2d 669, 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 776 (1974).
109. Id. at 400, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
110. Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 169, 368 P.2d 57, 60 (1962).
111. 195 Minn. 378, 380, 263 N.W. 154, 155 (1935), rev'd in part, Thill v.
Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969).
112. Johnson v. Luhman, 330 1ll. App. 598, 601, 71 N.E.2d 810, 811 (1947);
Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 405, 37 N.W.2d 543, 546 (1949).
113. 20 CORNELL L.Q. 255, 256 (1935).
114. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 312, 379 P.2d
513, 523 (1963), rev'd, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968); Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 50 Cal.
2d 664, 667, 328 P.2d 449, 451 (1958), rev'd, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).

respect to which claims should be upheld." 11 However, the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg held that "[t]he alleged
inability to fix definitions for recovery on the different facts of
future cases does not justify the denial of recovery on the specific
facts of the instant case . ... "116 In granting a wife recovery
for the negligent injury to her husband, the Rodriguez court disputed the "draw-the-line" rationale. "That the law might be urged
to move too far, in other words, is an unacceptable excuse for not
moving at all."'1 17
It has been held that it is the responsibility of the legislature
to make any changes in the "well-settled rule of the common law
denying to a child the right of action for personal injuries to his
'
parent."""
In considering the right of a woman to recover for
the negligent injury to her husband, the court in Deshotel held that
any departure from the overwhelming weight of authority in support of the common law rule should be left to the legislature. 11
However, at least one court in considering a child's cause of action
has held that it was not necessary "to wait for legislative sanction
before entertaining an action for which there is no judicial sanction."'120 In Rodriguez, the court held that the rationale of Deshotel had been rendered untenable, indicating that the primary
instrument of evolution in the common law system is the judiciary,

not the legislature.' 2' The courts compromise a basic responsibility when they abdicate to the legislature the essential function
of re-evaluating the common law. 22 It is the responsibility of
the judiciary to extend the common law in order to allow a child
to recover for the negligent injury to the parent.
115. Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 664,
668, 328 P.2d 449, 451 (1958), rev'd, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12
Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
116. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72, 79 (1968) (emphasis in original).
117. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 404, 525 P.2d 669,
683, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 779 (1974).
118. Halberg v. Young, 41 Hawaii 634, 647, 59 A.L.R.2d 445, 453 (1957).
119. 50 Cal. 2d 664, 669, 328 P.2d 449, 452 (1958), rev'd, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
120. Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D.D.C. 1952).
121. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 394, 525 P.2d 669,
676, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 772 (1974).
122. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 737, 441 P.2d 912, 918, 69 Cal. Rptr.
7Z 78 (1968); People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d 893, 895, 40
Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (1964); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 428, 170 N.E.2d
881, 892 (1960). For discussion of arguments against awaiting legislative
action in the common law area of torts, see Green, Protection of the Family
Under Tort Law, 10 HAsTiNGS L.J. 237, 246 (1959).
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CONCLUSION

When a parent is injured in an accident occasioned by defendant's
negligence, the child is not permitted to recover loss of consortium damages. The child's claim for the loss of society, care,
protection, support and affection should be recognized. It is difficult on the basis of natural justice to deny the child's right to recover for the loss of consortium of a negligently injured parent.
It is not easy to understand and appreciate this reluctance to compensate the child who has been deprived of the care, companionor for that matter his father,
ship and education of his mother,123
through the defendant's negligence.
The case for allowing the child loss of consortium damages is supported by the statutory principle that in the absence of statute or
public policy, each person injured by the act of another must be
compensated. Furthermore, an acknowledgement of the child's
cause of action would be consistent with the California Supreme
Court's liberal attitude toward establishing causes of action for injured plaintiffs. The rationale on which courts base their denial
seems clearly untenable. In light of these considerations, the California Supreme Court should once again accept the challenge of
judicial activism and grant a remedy to a child for the loss of the
society, care, protection, support and affection of a negligently injured parent.

MARY LEE TAYRIEN

123. W. PROSSER,

LAw OF TORTS

§ 125 at 896 (4th ed. 1971).

